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1. Introduction 
 
On 19 February 2013 in Brussels twenty-four EU Member States, including 
Italy, signed the ‘Agreement on a Unified Patent Court’(hereinafter, UPC 
Agreement). Bulgaria signed on 5 March, whilst Poland and Spain rejected the 
text and are not expected to change their attitude in a foreseeable future. As it is 
an international treaty open to any Member State of the EU 1, Croatia may accede 
as of 1st July 2013. To enter into force the UPC Agreement requires at least thir-
teen ratifications 2, Austria so far being the only State that has completed the rati-
fication process. Undoubtedly, in international law a signature of a treaty does 
not imply an obligation to ratify it. Yet, it is not deprived of any legal significan-
ce, since every government has the responsibility under general international law 
to take all the possible steps for its entry into force unless it declares a clear inten-
tion to the contrary 3. 
 
1 Article 84(4) UPC Agreement. Nothing suggests that accession will be permitted only to 
EU Member States which participate in the enhanced cooperation on patent with unitary ef-
fect: contra W. TILMANN, Moving towards completing the European Patent System: An Over-
view of the Draft Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, in ERA Forum, 2012, p. 87, at p. 90 
and 92. 
2 For details Article 89 UPC Agreement. 
3 In accordance with a general principle of treaty law, the signing of an international 
agreement, pending ratification procedures, entails that states must refrain from acts that 
 
 THE UNIFIED PATENT COURT – WHAT IS THE ‘COMMON’ TRAIT ABOUT?  
110 
The UPC Agreement is, so to say, an option B for both the EU Member States 
and, in the background, the Commission. It is indeed a re-adjustment of a previ-
ous failed attempt to found a unified patent litigation system. The latter was con-
ceived as a mixed agreement to be concluded by the EU, its Member States and 
an unknown number of third States 4, namely those participating in the European 
Patent Convention which includes 38 parties. The former Draft Agreement on 
the European and EU Patent Court, as it was then known, has been held incon-
sistent with the treaties by ECJ Opinion No 1/09 5. 
 
could undermine its object and purpose, unless their respective intentions not to become par-
ty to the agreement itself have been made clear (Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the 
law of treaties). 
4 The adjective ‘unknown’ relates to the fact that, quite unusually, that Draft was not nego-
tiated with third States at all. Along with the Commission scheme, the EEUPC Agreement was 
a constituent element of a normative package aimed at completing the internal market. Third 
States could, if they wanted to, join the Agreement later on. For the general features of the 
EEUPC Agreement see T. JAEGER, R. HILTY, J. DREXL, H. ULLRICH, Comments of the Max 
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law on the 2009 Commission 
Proposal for the Establishment of a Unified European Patent Judiciary’, in ICC, 2009, p. 817, at 
p. 824. 
5 Opinion No 1/09 of 8 March 2011. In short, the ECJ argued that the exclusive jurisdic-
tion conferred to that international Patent Court would have deprived the national courts of 
the EU Member States of their role as EU courts. This institutional divestment would have 
only been counterbalanced by the conferral of the exclusive competence to make a prelimi-
nary reference to the EEUPC in accordance with a mechanism which was similar to the one 
laid down in Article 267 TFEU. Opinion No 1/09 drew the attention to the link between the 
planned international jurisdiction and EU law. The central question did not concern the pow-
ers of the Patent Court in the field of the classical European patent. It rather related to the 
administration of the future EU patent (para 59). As the Draft aimed at creating a new judicial 
body, the Court recalled the ‘fundamental elements of the legal order and judicial system of 
the European Union’, namely that it is a ‘new legal order’, possessing its ‘own’ institutions. 
Member States and their nationals are the subjects of that order, its essential features being 
primacy and direct effect of EU law (paras 64-65). The Court highlighted also that the ‘guard-
ians’of that legal order and its system of judicial protection are the Court of Justice «and the 
courts and tribunals of the Member States» (para 66). However, it is for the Court (alone) to 
ensure respect for the autonomy of the EU legal order created by the treaties (para 67). Sub-
sequently, the focus is back on the Member States and their judges. The ECJ recalled that, 
pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), Member States ensure the 
effective application of EU law. In this context, national courts – along with the ECJ – play a 
decisive role in the judicial protection of individuals’rights arising from that law (paras 68-69), 
stressing again that the EU legal order has established a ‘complete’ system of legal procedures 
and remedies in order to guarantee the judicial review of the acts of the institutions (a system 
of direct and indirect remedies). Then the ECJ outlined the main features of the planned in-
ternational Patent Court. First, by underlining that it is an organization with a distinct legal 
personality under international law, it noted that the envisaged litigation body was detached 
from the system provided for in Article 19(1) TEU. Second, it listed the fields of its exclusive 
jurisdiction, remarking that, according to Article 15 of the Draft, national courts would enjoy 
no more power to adjudicate in that regard (paras 71 and 72). The ECJ also stressed that, pur-
suant to Article 14a of the Draft, the Patent Court would interpret and apply EU law. The 
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Given its mere international nature, the second revised instrument raises inter 
alia the issue as to whether Member States retain the power to draw up interna-
tional agreements among themselves outside the EU legal framework for EU re-
lated matters. It does not concern the scope of this paper and cannot be dealt 
with here 6. It suffices to recall that even EU secondary law sets legal limits to the 
autonomous action of the Member States under international law 7. In short, the 
entry into force of the UPC Agreement will require beforehand some necessary 
amendments of the so-called Brussels I regime, whose application will be affected 
by the new judicature in several aspects 8. 
The UPC is an essential component of the normative package recently adopt-
ed with the aim to complete the single market as regards the area of intellectual 
property rights 9. As is known, the two Regulations are contentious. Spain and It-
 
consequential effect would be to confer upon it the competences normally held by national 
courts to hear disputes in the field of EU patents and to ensure, in this field, the full effective-
ness of EU law and the judicial protection of individual rights stemming from it (para 73). 
Third, the (international) Patent Court would have affected both the powers of national 
courts of EU Member States to interpret and apply EU Law, and the power to request a pre-
liminary ruling from the ECJ and its own power to reply (para 77). Indeed, the Patent Court 
(a) would be called upon to interpret not only the EU law provisions related to the field of the 
Community Patent Regulation but also other rules on intellectual property, rules of the inter-
nal market and competition law, as well as general principles of EU law and its fundamental 
rights (para 78). (b) This new litigation body would take the place of national courts according 
to Articles 15 and 48 of the Draft, preventing them from requesting preliminary rulings by the 
ECJ. Hence, in this field, the Patent Court would become the sole competent Court to com-
municate with the ECJ by means of a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation 
and application of EU law (para 79). (c) Undoubtedly, the draft provided for a preliminary 
ruling mechanism which allows/constraints the Patent Court to refer questions to the ECJ. 
However, as the ECJ pointed out, this result is achieved «while removing that power from the 
national courts» (para 81). The ECJ concluded that the Draft was inconsistent with the trea-
ties because it weakened the role of national judges as ordinary courts of EU law and, indirect-
ly albeit significantly, the ECJ powers. In the judicial system of the EU, it is up to the national 
courts to adjudicate on direct actions of individuals in the field of patents, and Member States 
cannot deprive their courts of their tasks as ordinary courts of EU law. For this reason, their 
activity involves the power of referring questions for a preliminary ruling (para 80). This 
would amount – the Court insisted – to a removal of the competences of national courts. See 
R. BARATTA, National Courts as ‘Guardians’and ‘Ordinary Courts’of EU Law: Opinion 1/09 of 
the ECJ, in Legal Issues of Ec. Integr., 2011, p. 296; S. ADAM, Le mécanisme prejudicial, limite 
fonctionelle à la competence externe de l’Union. Note sur l’avis 1/09 de la Cour de Justice, in 
Cah. dr. eur., 2011, p. 277; J. ALBERTI, Il parere della Corte di giustizia sul Tribunale dei brevet-
ti europeo e comunitario, in Dir. Un. Eur., 2012, p. 367. 
6 Recently in that respect ruling of 27 November 2012, C-370/12 Pringle, paras 68, 69. 
7 Contra, W. TILMANN, Moving towards completing the European Patent System cit., p. 93. 
8 See infra, next footnote and Sec. 3.4. 
9 EU Regulation No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 De-
cember 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection and Council Regulation No 1260/2012 of 17 December 2012 implementing enhan-
ced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the ap-
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aly challenged the validity of the ‘fathering’ Decision on the enhanced coopera-
tion adopted by 25 Member States, but the ECJ rejected the application 10. Spain 
has coherently claimed also the invalidity of the two implementing Regulations 11. 
Be as it may, there has always been a large consensus among institutions, na-
tional governments (including the Spanish and Italian ones), as well as stakehold-
ers on the need to set up a unified and specialized patent court, having compe-
tence for both EPO and EU patents 12. One of the most convincing arguments for 
creating a unique litigation system in the EU has been explained by an independ-
ent economic study undertaken for the Commission: the private costs (local at-
torneys, experts and court fees) of multiple litigations in Europe ‘would range be-
tween 148 and 289 million Euros in 2013’ 13. Thus, the reasoning behind a unified 
litigation body is hardly disputable in terms of policy – should these costs be 
saved, they could be partly or totally devoted to innovation and research, and ul-
timately to improve the competitiveness of the European industry as a whole. 
This holds true particularly for SMÈs. Furthermore, a unified jurisdiction, based 
on highly qualified judges and efficient procedures, would generally entail more 
legal certainty for inventors and companies. 
 
plicable translation arrangements. As is known, the new patent package requires several 
amendments of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial. 
10 Joined cases C-274/11 and C-295/11, Spain and Italy v Council. It is interesting to note 
that the EP, the Commission and ten Member States intervened in supporting the Council 
position. It is not possible to address the pleas raised by Spain and Italy: for a complete pictu-
re of these pleas see H. ULLRICH, Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Unitary Patent Protec-
tion and European Integration, in ERA Forum, 2013, p. 589, suggesting that ECJ should have 
retained the plaintiffs’pleas.  
11 At the time of writing, cases C-146/13 and C-147/13 are pending before ECJ. 
12 The European Patent Convention has its own inherent drawbacks in terms not only of 
fragmentation of the patent rules, but also because it lacks a single jurisdiction for litigation. 
As is known, in the so-called Munich system, disputes on infringements (proceedings seeking 
to enforce patent rights) and revocations (proceedings challenging the validity of patents gran-
ted by the relevant authority) remain the sole responsibility of the domestic courts. Multiple li-
tigation in different States on the same patent issue may occur, accompanied by legal uncer-
tainties, as well as greater litigation costs for companies and Small and Medium Sized Enter-
prises (SMEs). Suffice it to recall that the fragmentation of the litigation on patents has inevi-
tably led, inter alia, first to a ‘forum shopping’ strategy, the attacking party choosing the most 
convenient jurisdiction with regard to its own interests, and, second, to ‘torpedo motions’, a 
delaying strategy based on actions for declaring non-infringements lodged in jurisdictional sys-
tems known for dispensing justice slowly. 
13 Cf. D. HARHOFF, Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Unified and Integrated European Pa-
tent LitigationSystem, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/ 
studies/litigation_system_en.pdf, 26 February 2009, p. 16, at p. 41; T. JAEGER, R. HILTY, J. 
DREXL, H. ULLRICH, Comments of the Max Planck Institute cit., p. 818 and 822, whereby 
more bibliographical references. 
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The current situation as concerns litigations on European bundle patents is far 
from being satisfactory. At present, the European Patent Convention lays down 
common rules on the granting of patents only 14. As a result, the related titles, 
while covering different territories, imply that infringing acts and exceptions or 
limitations are governed by the national laws of the contracting States for which 
those titles have been separately granted (patent territoriality). Since the different 
exclusive rights are substantially differentiated, the ensuing result is a fragmenta-
tion of national decisions. Admittedly, stricto sensu there is no risk of contradic-
tory decisions, should infringement proceedings be brought before a number of 
courts in different contracting States with respect to a European patent granted 
on each of those States 15. However, a unified judicial system capable of adjudicat-
ing a genuine EU patent based on uniform provisions, i.e. laying down a truly su-
pranational patent protection 16, has always been rightly considered as a remarka-
ble step forward for inventors and industry. In addition, it is worth recalling that 
the EU package on patents does not replace existing national laws and therefore 
it just provides users with more choices. 
That being said, the rationale for unifying the litigation system such as the le-
gal certainty, the procedural economies among EU Member States, or the risks of 
fragmented judgments on the same invention, have become increasingly debated 
by stakeholders and practitioners in some States 17. Protectionism of the status 
quo has historically prevailed so as to halt any step forward towards an EU patent 
system 18. While views differ on the pros and cons as whether to join or reject the 
Brussels Agreement, the debate should however focus on the general interest and 
choices of industrial policy for each State 19. 
 
14 Articles 2(2) and 64(1) EPC. 
15 ECJ, 13 July 2006, case C-539/03, Roche Nederland BV v. Primus, paras 29 to 35. 
16 One may query whether the two Regulations composing the EU patent package provide 
for a truly uniform regime: H. ULLRICH, Enhanced cooperation, cit., p. 598; R. BARATTA, Art. 
118, in A. TIZZANO (ed.), Trattati dell’Unione europea, Milano, 2014. 
17 For an overview of the current debate in Italy Corriere della sera, Brevetto Ue, l’Italia ris-
chia la marginalità (e 19 milioni), 3 January 2013, p. 33. 
18 T. JAEGER, The EU Patent: cui bono et quo vadit ?, in CML Rev., 2010, p. 63, 64. 
19 As regards the EPC (bundle) patents granted in 2012, Italy, among the EU Member 
States, is the third country in the EPO ranking, after Germany and France, but before the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. According to the EPO, Facts and figures 2013, Mu-
nich, 2013, p. 16, in the scoreboard of European bundle patents granted by country of origin 
in 2012, that is to say «allocated to the country of residence of the first-named patentee», Ger-
many accounted for 20.3%, France 7.3%, Italy 3.4%, the UK 3.1 % and the Netherlands 
2.6%. Arguably, despite the fact that the economic crisis may have affected the capacity to in-
novate and research, Italy should be keen to enhance the protection of inventors’and compa-
nies’rights. That seems all the more so if one considers that in Italy GDP and employment 
shares in all IPR-intensive industry in 2010 was, respectively, 40.8% and 26.8%, whereas with 
regard to Germany these figures were 45.9% and 27.4% (EPO and OHIM, Intellectual prop-
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This paper addresses a specific topic of the patent package. It aims to assess 
the ‘common’ nature of the UPC, as it is defined by the Agreement. It is self-
evident that it is an international court, given the legal instrument holding it. Yet, 
it seems worth trying to shed some light on the features of this quite unusual ju-
dicial construct (sections 3 and 4), after having briefly recalled its origin which is 
strictly intertwined with the failure of the previous mentioned attempt to set up 
an international court for European patents (section 2). 
 
 
2. The ECJ’s ‘suggestion’ in Opinion No 1/09 
 
First of all, it seems worth recalling that after Opinion No 1/09 there were at 
least three possible routes whereby to pursue the objective to set up a unified pa-
tent litigation system: (i) the trademark judiciary model; (ii) the EU law-based ju-
diciary, by making use of Article 262 TFEU; (iii) the Benelux archetype. 
The first two options were swiftly dismissed on a set of grounds. Basically, the 
trademark judiciary model, albeit consistent with primary law, would have hardly 
matched the need, reiterated inter alia by the governments, to set up a unified 
and specialized judge in this domain. As a matter of fact, economic models and 
the US experience suggest that ensuring a uniform high quality of professional 
experience is essential in the patent area 20. 
As regards the EU judiciary way out (proposed inter alia by Italy at the outset 
of the legislative process in 2007), first, the above-mentioned plea was somehow 
reiterated: some argued that the EU judges are not sufficiently specialized to deal 
with the inherent peculiarities of patent law. Second, even the ECJ was not en-
thusiastic with the plan to set up a specialized body, most likely to be attached to 
the General Court. Quite on the contrary, it did not hide its reluctance to accept 
new powers in disputes relating to intellectual property rights 21. In its legal as-
sessment, Article 262 TFEU can be used to confer «on the Court some of the 
powers which it is proposed to grant to the Patent Court»; it is however just an 
‘option’ and «not the only conceivable way of creating a unified patent court»; in 
any case, that provision «does not establish a monopoly for the Court» as regards 
individual disputes in the field of intellectual property rights 22. Third, some 
Member States, given the current historical context, were not eager to increase 
the competences of the EU judges. Finally, the veto power inherent in that legal 
 
erty rights intensive industries: contribute to economic performance and employment in the Eu-
ropean Union. Industrial-Level Analysis Report, September 2013, p. 83). For a different per-
spective, see V. CERULLI IRELLI, Il Tribunale unificato dei brevetti: rischi e compatibilità con il 
nostro ordinamento, in Dir. Ind., 2013, p. 393, at p. 403. 
20 T. JAEGER, The EU Patent cit., p. 95. 
21 Opinion No 1/09 cit., para 61. 
22 Ibidem, para 62. 
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basis (given that its decision-making process requires unanimity within the Coun-
cil) was widely perceived as a huge obstacle suggesting the non pursuit of that 
model. This holds true in particular if one considers the highly (politically) con-
tentious issue on the linguistic regime of the EU patent, when in 2011 it became 
clear that many Member States, alongside the Commission, were ready to seek 
recourse to the enhanced cooperation instrument. Blocking the judiciary volet 
through a veto mechanism would have implied the failure of the entire normative 
package on patents 23. 
In the end, it was soon understood that building upon the judicial model of 
the Benelux Court of Justice for trademarks was the only way forward. After all, 
it was a solution which appeared as a relatively safe harbor in terms of compati-
bility with the primary law and the founding principles laid down in the constitu-
tional case law of the ECJ. For Opinion No 1/09 emphasised «that the situation 
of the PC envisaged by the draft agreement would differ from that of the Benelux 
Court of Justice which was the subject of Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior 
[1997] ECR I-6013, paragraphs 21 to 23. Since the Benelux Court is a court 
common to a number of Member States, situated, consequently, within the judi-
cial system of the European Union, its decisions are subject to mechanisms ca-
pable of ensuring the full effectiveness of the rules of the European Union» 24. In 
short, the UPC Agreement pursues the goal to set up a judiciary body in line with 
ECJ Opinion No 1/09, i.e. a judicature ‘common’ to the participating States as 
suggested by the ECJ and, consequently, capable of ensuring the effectiveness of 
EU law, notably in terms of respecting the structural principles of the EU judicial 
system 25. The new UPC text has ultimately endeavored to align this judicial body 
with those principles along Opinion No 1/09 footprints 26. 
 
 
 
 
23 T. JAEGER, R. HILTY, J. DREXL, H. ULLRICH, Comments of the Max Planck Institute, cit., 
p. 829, at p. 830 argued that the EU judge solution did not allow «for the establishment of de-
centralized judicial panels outside Luxembourg». However, pending negotiations Italy and 
other countries put forward an opposite view. 
24 Opinion No 1/09 cit., para 82. 
25 However, the final construction of the UPC Agreement does not overlap the Benelux 
Court’s features which limited its competence to preliminary references made by national 
judges and so working jointly with them. However on 12 October 2012 Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands signed a Protocol aimed at amending the Benelux Court Treaty: it will 
have the possibility to rule in specific civil and commercial matters. It is to be noted that the 
Benelux Court on trademarks and design relies on a common substantive law, given that na-
tional laws no longer exist in Benelux countries, while the UPC will have to apply national law 
to the EU patent with unitary effect. 
26 G. TRIET, M. VIVANT, Juridiction européenne: une nouvelle donne pour le brevet?, in Cah. 
dr. entrepr., 2012, p. 41, at p. 46. 
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3. The ‘common’ judicature features 
 
The structure of the UPC is relatively simple since it has been construed to 
adjudicate effectively, with effectiveness implying the ability to deliver high quali-
ty judgments within a fair period of time and at a reasonable cost for inventors 
and companies. Overall the Agreement sets out to create better legal framework 
conditions for all parties involved in patent litigation – whether as patent owner, 
competitor or third party – due to simplified, swifter and more efficient judicial 
procedures, as well as an option for alternative dispute resolution. It comprises a 
Court of First Instance, a Court of Appeal and a Registry – a simplified structure 
given that its jurisdiction is expected to cover in principle the EU Member States 
or most of them. The Court of First Instance is composed of a central division 
with an office in Paris and two thematic sections in London (concerning mainly 
chemistry and pharmaceutical cases, as well as human necessities) and Munich 
(roughly, mechanical engineering cases). The contracting Member States have the 
ability to set up a number of local and regional divisions subject to certain condi-
tions being met. The Court of Appeal and the Registry are located in Luxem-
bourg. A patent mediation and arbitration Centre is provided for, with a double 
premise, in Ljubljana and Lisbon. Finally, a ‘training framework’ for judges is set 
up, whose facilities are in Budapest 27. One may wonder whether the fragmenta-
tion of premises – due to a political decision made by the European Council in 
July 2012 at the very end of negotiation – can have an adverse impact on the ef-
fectiveness of the UPC functions. 
As is usual for any international judicature, the ‘multinational composition’ of 
both the panels of the Court of First Instance 28 and the Court of Appeal 29, is 
mostly ensured. Judges are appointed by a common administrative body. Fur-
thermore, the UPC Agreement is an international treaty that intentionally has not 
been equipped with a withdrawal clause 30. All EU Member States may partici-
pate 31, and unlike its predecessor it is not open to the EU and third States 32. 
 
27 Article 19(1) UPC Agreement. 
28 Article 8(1) UPC Agreement. 
29 Article 9(1) UPC Agreement. 
30 It is useful to mention that the UPC Agreement does not provide for a withdrawal 
clause. Pending negotiations the proposal to provide for such a clause was made in Warsaw. 
Member States accepted the Commission’s rejection: since the envisaged agreement was an 
essential part of the patent package strictly related to the EU legal framework, there was no 
room to include such a clause. As a result, the termination of the UPC Agreement pursuant to 
Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties is hardly applicable. Yet, termina-
tion would still be possible by consent of all the parties (Articles 55 and 57 of that Conven-
tion), and in particular due to a fundamental change of circumstances (Article 62 of the same 
Convention). 
31 Arguing from Articles 2(a) and 84(4) UPC Agreement. 
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According to Article 1(2), first sentence of the UPC Agreement: «The Unified 
Patent Court shall be a court common to the Contracting Member States …» 33. 
But what is the ‘common’ feature precisely about? It seems important to notice 
that the ‘common nature’ of the UPC is not just a label added to the wording of 
the Agreement in order to artfully circumvent the outcome of Opinion No 1/09. 
It is laid down in a number of varied features which have been shaped in order to 
meet the ECJ concerns on the former structure. These features are examined sev-
erally and put in context with the aim to give a complete picture of this ‘com-
mon’ trait. 
 
 
3.1. The UPC as a unique judicature built into the Member States’judicial sys-
tem. -- The UPC is to be conceived as a judicature inherently integrated in each 
of the contracting Member States’judicial system. The Agreement involves a 
transferral or, if one prefers, a delegation of the power to adjudicate from the 
contracting States to the new judicature. Justice for individual litigations is con-
sequently delivered as a joint function, though, definitively, within the limits of 
the judicial competences attributed to the UPC. In that respect, it is worth noting 
that the UPC enjoys ratione materiae an exclusive power to adjudicate as regards 
a set of European patent disputes, i.e. the European patents which benefit from 
unitary effect in accordance with Regulation No 1257/2012, and the classical Eu-
ropean bundle patents granted under the provisions of the 1973 European Patent 
Convention and subsequent amendments 34. The UPC has no competence with 
regard to national patents. Thus, instead of being sued in a national judicature 
under the Brussels I Regulation, a defendant will be brought before a local, re-
gional or central division of the UPC. As a necessary corollary of the exclusivity 
character, national courts of participating States are accordingly divested of the 
 
32 Being outside the legal sources of the EU framework, it cannot be subject to a prelimi-
nary opinion of the ECJ pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU. Were it accessible at least to the 
EU, the possibility to enlighten the issue of its compatibility with the treaties beforehand 
would exist. However, a preliminary ruling or other actions could be a way to have access to 
the ECJ. 
33 Likewise, Article 71a of the Commission proposal for a Regulation amending Brussels I 
Regulation, COM(2013) 554 final. 
34 As explicitly stated in Article 32 UPC Agreement, the Court shall have exclusive compe-
tence with respect to action for actual or threatened infringements of patents (and supplemen-
tary protection certificates), as well as for revocation of patents (and for the declaration of in-
validity of supplementary protection certificates). It is noteworthy that, unlike the previous 
EEUPC, the UPC competence includes the administrative disputes concerning the issuing of 
patents by EPO. That is to say, actions concerning decisions of the EPO in carrying out the 
tasks provided for in Article 9 of EU Regulation No 1257/2012 (Article 32(1)(i)). As regards 
the jurisdiction of the Court, see M. BRANDI-DOHRN, Some Critical Observations on Compe-
tence and Procedure of the Unified Patent Court, in IIC, 2012, p. 372, at p. 375. 
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judicial power conferred to the UPC 35. Judicial authorities, which are used to re-
siding within the exclusive remit of the national systems, become a common task 
carried out by a unique and mutually integrated judicature. 
 
 
3.2. The UPC enjoys a power to adjudicate governed by uniform provisions. -- 
A relevant feature of this construct, taking also into account the Brussels I regime 
and its undergoing revision, is that the UPC enjoys an international, as well as an 
internal (ratione loci) power to adjudicate both governed by uniform provisions. 
Indeed, its international jurisdiction is determined by the Brussels I Regulation 36. 
However, the latter no longer concerns the coordination of different national ju-
dicatures, but a single judicial structure. The ratione loci competence – i.e. its al-
location between the UPC local, regional and central divisions – is governed by 
the UPC Agreement itself 37: on the whole, the territorial distribution of the pow-
er to adjudicate among the different participating States is construed as if it were 
a uniform and a common matter. In other words, by envisaging a common judici-
ary for both infringement actions and actions for revocation of patents (as well as 
for the invalidity of supplementary protection certificates), the Agreement aims at 
allocating the territorial power to adjudicate in accordance with its own provi-
sions. It is intended to supersede, as a means of improving the current legal 
framework, the Brussels I regime, while respecting its rules of international juris-
diction. This is not without problems since it raises a question of coordination 
between the UPC Agreement and a relevant piece of the acquis. The need seems 
likely to re-assess the objectives pursued by the Brussels I Regulation, namely the 
rationale for the connection between the proceedings and the territories of dif-
ferent EU Member States, the predictability of its rules on jurisdiction, the link 
between the national court and the action in order to facilitate the sound admin-
istration of justice, and the objective pursued by the rules on exclusive jurisdic-
tion in proceedings related to the registration or validity of patents. The ECJ held 
for instance that the jurisdiction of the national court in which the deposit or reg-
istration has been applied for or made aims to insure the rulings of a court which 
is in the best position to adjudicate owing to the fact that the register is kept in its 
territory, and it is deemed to apply its own national law on the validity and effects 
of the patent which has been granted in that State 38. This jurisprudence might be 
 
35 In this respect, the transitional regime (under Article 83, during a period of seven years af-
ter the entry into force of the UPC Agreement actions may be brought before national courts or 
authorities) does not affect per se the exclusivity principle enshrined in the UPC Agreement. 
36 Or, where applicable, on the basis of the Lugano Convention (Article 31 UPC Agree-
ment). 
37 Article 33 UPC Agreement. 
38 ECJ, 15 November 1983, case 288/82, Duijnstee v. Goderbauer, paras 24 et seq.; 13 July 
2006, case C-4/03, GAT v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau, paras 20 et seq. 
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revisited because of the new scenario: a unified judicial entity which, first, ab-
sorbs national jurisdictions, second, is deemed to rule on a European title that is 
granted and registered by a common body (the EPO) and, third, that title is 
based on a ‘unitary effect’(EU law) principle. Against this new background, the 
ECJ will have the last word pursuant to Article 19 TEU, when assessing the over-
all coherence of the UPC provisions with the EU legal framework. 
 
 
3.3 Consequences in terms of recognition and enforcement of rulings. – The ju-
dicial activity, being mutually integrated, entails no minor consequences in terms 
of recognition and enforcement of judgments either. A basic distinction should be 
made between the classical European bundle patent granted under the Munich 
Convention, on the one hand, and the European patent with unitary effect (i.e. de-
livered under Regulations No 1257/2012 and 1260/2012), on the other hand. As 
regards the latter, «decisions and orders» of the UPC are considered as if they 
were national rulings. However, in that regard the only question the Agreement 
addresses is that of UPC judgments being enforced in the different contracting 
States. So it does not lay down any uniform provisions concerning their enforcea-
bility in the territories of the contracting States – it just provides for the applica-
tion of national laws 39. This is quite logical because the Agreement does not pur-
sue the objective of harmonizing national enforcement procedures. Moreover, 
UPC judgments on European patents with unitary effect will cover only the terri-
tories of Member States which participate both in the new judicature and in the 
enhanced cooperation. Although a State non participating in the enhanced coop-
eration may ratify the UPC Agreement only, its local division would not enjoy any 
judicial power over patents with unitary effect, but over disputes concerning the 
Munich bundle patents 40. That would be the case if for instance Italy decided to 
embrace this hybrid form of participation in the EU patent package 41. 
 
39 Actually, UPC decisions and orders are enforceable in any contracting Member State in 
accordance with the law applicable where the enforcement takes place, Article 82(1) and (3) 
UPC Agreement. 
40 Less flexibility is instead available for the twenty-five Member States that have already 
joined the enhanced cooperation, since there is a strong interaction between the two EU Re-
gulations and the UPC Agreement. The two EU Regulations on the unitary patent protection 
shall apply from the date of the entry into force of the Agreement, and a European patent for 
which unitary effect is registered has unitary effect only in those participating Member States 
in which the Unified Patent Court has exclusive jurisdiction (Article 18(2) second subpara 
Regulation No 1257/2012). 
41 This perspective would recognize the key importance of the UPC, though an asymmetric 
participation is deemed to raise legal uncertainties which cannot be addressed here. Another 
option would be to stay outside the UPC, as suggested by some commentators (for instance V. 
CERULLI IRELLI, Il Tribunale unificato, cit.). However, the least one can point out is that, even 
in that case, nothing would preserve Italian companies from the adjudication power of the 
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It is worth recalling that the same provision (on enforcement of judgments in 
any contracting Member State in accordance with the law applicable where the 
enforcement takes place) applies to the European bundle patent too. However, 
as far as this title is concerned the UPC «decisions and orders» will cover the ter-
ritories of those contracting States for which the European patent has effect 42. 
The underlying rationale is that the classical European bundle patent is usually 
granted for a limited number of States which may not all be part of the UPC 
Agreement. As a result, in practice, if all the concerned States do participate in it, 
decisions and orders would embrace all the corresponding territories; if, on the 
contrary, the Munich patent were to cover among others the territory of a non 
contracting State (for instance, Poland or Spain), the relevant decision or order 
would not be per se applicable in that State, though it could be relevant there on 
a different legal basis as indicated infra. 
 
 
3.4 The UPC as a body benefiting from the Brussels I regime. – Since the UPC 
has been construed as a Court inherently embedded within the national judicial 
systems of the contracting EU Member States, it necessarily benefits from the 
provisions of the Brussels I regime: its decisions and orders are recognized and 
enforced in the EU Member States which will choose not to be part to the UPC 
Agreement itself. Indeed, a recent Commission proposal aims at including a new 
Article 71d in the revised Regulation so that the Brussels I regime «shall apply to 
the recognition and enforcement of judgments given by the Unified Patent Court 
… which need to be recognized and enforced in Member States which are not 
Contracting Parties to the UPC» and vice versa 43. A more recent version of this 
provision 44 does not modify that essential normative character: the UPC, a com-
 
UPC divisions if one of the connecting factors occurs pursuant to Article 32 UPC Agreement. 
Since the forum commissi delicti or the forum rei have been shaped quite widely, it would not 
be a remote result to see Italian companies sued before a division of the Court of First In-
stance, regardless of the Italian participation in the Agreement. 
42 Article 34 UPC Agreement. 
43 COM(2013) 554 final of 26.7.2013, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, p. 10.  
44 The updated version of Article 71d (1) reads as follows: «The rules of this Regulation 
shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of: (a) judgments given by a common court 
which are to be recognised and enforced in a Member State not party to the agreement esta-
blishing the common court; and (b) judgments given by the courts of a Member State not par-
ty to the agreement establishing the common court which are to be recognised and enforced 
in a Member State party to that agreement». In addition, Article 71(2) provides that the Brus-
sels I Regulation does not apply to the recognition and enforcement judgments given by the 
common court and states parties to the agreement establishing the common court. The latter 
provision is necessary in order to a priori avoid inconsistencies between the international 
agreement and the acquis which enjoys primacy over the former. 
 ROBERTO BARATTA  
121 
mon judicature equated to national judicial bodies, will deliver judgments which 
are to be recognized and enforced throughout the EU, even in Member States 
not ratifying the UPC Agreement. In the event of a ruling holding the invalidity 
of a European bundle patent, it seems however, as noted above, that such ruling 
cannot embrace the territory of an EU Member State which is not party to the 
UPC Agreement. But would the economic value of a patent not be affected, 
should it meanwhile be declared invalid in all States where it was validated apart 
from the one of the Member States staying outside the UPC system? One may 
wonder whether the territoriality principle of patents in the EU area will start to 
fade out, if and when the EU patent package enters into force. 
 
 
3.5 The UPC as body placed under the `ex-ante Supervisory Judicial Model´ of the 
ECJ. – Built-into the national judicatures, the unified judicial body is placed under 
the `ex-ante Supervisory Judicial Model´ stemming from the classic referral to the 
ECJ 45. Consequently, the fundamental role of the ECJ in protecting individual rights 
under the preliminary ruling procedure, is preserved 46. The scope of the ECJ super-
visory power seems even wider than it appears prima facie. First, the preliminary rul-
ing mechanism under the UPC Agreement needs to be interpreted broadly because 
the supervisory role of the ECJ is a founding mechanism of the EU legal order. 
Second, and more specifically, the UPC will be called upon to interpret and 
apply the two Regulations, as well as other legal acts of EU law, which will be 
necessarily be read in conjunction with the treaty rules concerning the internal 
market and competition law. Furthermore, the dispute pending before the UPC 
may well imply the interpretation and application of the fundamental rights and 
the general principles of EU law, or even require touching upon the validity of an 
EU provision 47. In these situations, the ECJ’s role cannot be challenged. 
Third, Regulation No 1257/2012 enshrines the principle of uniform protec-
tion, by stating that an EU patent «shall confer on its proprietor the right to pre-
vent any third party from committing acts against which the patent provides pro-
tection throughout the territories of the participating Member States in which it 
has unitary effect, subject to applicable limitations» 48; besides, «the scope of that 
 
45 In accordance with Article 21 UPC Agreement «… the Court shall cooperate with the 
Court of Justice of the European Union to ensure the correct application and uniform interpre-
tation of Union law, as any national court, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU in particular. 
Decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be binding on the Court». 
46 The foundational premise of the preliminary ruling procedure under the EU judicial sy-
stem, as progressively construed by the ECJ jurisprudence, has been described in R. BARATTA, 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR: The rationale for the ECJ’s prior involvement mechanism, in 
CML Rev., 2013, p. 1305, at p. 1323. 
47 Opinion No 1/09 cit., para 78. 
48 Article 5(1) Regulation No 1257/2012. 
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right and its limitations shall be uniform in all participating Member States in 
which the patent has unitary effect» 49. The patent is supposed to be granted with 
the same set of claims for all the participating Member States to the enhanced 
cooperation instrument. 
The principle of uniform protection is complemented by the UPC Agreement 
to which the EU is not a party. As is known, some provisions (namely, former Ar-
ticles 6 to 8 of a previous text of the Regulation) were deleted at the very end of 
negotiation by the three institutions in the framework of the enhanced coopera-
tion, on a clear impulse of the European Council held in June 2012. Articles 25 to 
27 of the UPC Agreement would apply instead. Yet, this devise hardly excludes 
the competence of the ECJ. On the one hand, no doubt any limitation of the ef-
fect of a unitary patent based on EU secondary law instruments by virtue of ex-
plicit references to these instruments enshrined in Article 27 of the UPC Agree-
ment, entails the ECJ preliminary ruling competence. On the other hand and 
most importantly, the ‘uniform protection’ is an EU law principle pursuant to Ar-
ticle 5 Regulation No 1257/2012: it must be applied consistently throughout the 
EU participating States. In other words, the exclusivity principle – that is to say, 
the right to prevent both the direct or indirect use of the invention, within the 
limitations and exceptions which may regard the effect of a patent – is defined by 
that Regulation and is to be interpreted and applied as a uniform concept 50, 
though it is actually defined by Articles 25 to 27 of the UPC Agreement. To this 
extent, the ECJ ‘supervisory role’ should be maintained. 
Therefore, the Regulation and the UPC Agreement contain a set of cross-
references which entail a relevance for EU law. The former fulfills the normative 
task to substantiate the unitary effect protection throughout the Union as fore-
seen by Article 118 TFEU. Since it can be presumed that Regulation No 
1257/2012 has complied with that primary law requirement, it would hardly be 
denying this sort of attractive function of the UPC provisions under EU law, re-
gardless that these provisions have been artificially placed outside. Should a dif-
ferent approach be pursued – asserting in particular that the international law 
provisions are outside the scope of ECJ preliminary jurisdiction – one might cast 
doubts on the consistency of Regulation No 1257/2012 with primary law and, 
most likely, with the ECJ jurisprudence on the founding role of its ‘supervisory’ 
function within the EU legal system. 
 
 
49 Article 5(2) Regulation No 1257/2012. For different perspectives of the unitary charac-
ter of the patent protection under the EU Regulations see W. TILMANN, Moving towards com-
pleting the European Patent System, cit., p. 93, while H. ULLRICH, Enhanced Cooperation, cit., 
p. 597, rightly suggests that the deletion of Article 6 to 8 will have limited practical impact, 
and that the unitary effect is essentially a matter of EU law. 
50 See in particular Article 6 concerning the exhaustion of the rights conferred by a Euro-
pean patent with unitary effect. 
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3.6 The primacy of EU law over the UPC Agreement. – All the above men-
tioned features of the UPC system explain, on the one hand, why it has to ensure 
the full application and respect of Union law, as well as the judicial protection of 
individuals’rights laid down in the EU legal order. This consequence precisely 
stems from the assumption that the UPC is subject to the same obligations under 
Union law as any national court of the Contracting Member States 51. On the oth-
er hand, these features elucidate the primacy of EU law over the Agreement 
which is anyhow explicitly laid down 52. Somehow ironically, it retains a notion of 
primacy so wide in scope that it is unprecedented with respect to the EU legal 
system 53. 
 
3.7 Individual and joint responsibility in the event that the UPC infringes EU 
law. – In the context of this integrated judicial construct it comes as no surprise 
that the activities of the UPC organs are directly attributed to the contracting 
States. 
The wording of Article 23 of the UPC Agreement concerning the infringe-
ment procedure is worthy of note: actions of the UPC are attributed to each State 
«individually … and to all Contracting Member States collectively». That implies 
two consequences in terms of States’responsibility whenever the UPC infringes 
EU law, including the obligation to request preliminary rulings by the ECJ. On 
the one hand, the contracting Member States may be sued for violation of EU 
law according to the usual infringement procedures pursuant to Articles 258, 259 
and 260 TFEU. On the other hand, as the EU States are liable for damages 
caused to individuals by infringements of EU law according to the Köbler rul-
ing 54, likewise the UPC States are «jointly and severally liable for damages» 
caused by the Court of Appeal 55. Restricting the scope of this provision to the 
Court of Appeal activity only appears reasonable. Applicants for non-contractual 
liability have to exhaust the internal remedy before suing the contracting States 
for damages. Subsequent provisions aim at defining the national judge competent 
to rule in these cases 56, the applicable law and the contracting Member State 
 
51 Article 1(2), second sentence, UPC Agreement.  
52 Article 20 states that «The Court shall apply Union law in its entirety and shall respect 
its primacy». 
53 As the preamble of the UPC Agreement points out, «the primacy of Union law includes 
the TEU, the TFEU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the general 
principles of Union law as developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, and in 
particular the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal and a fair and public hearing with-
in a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal, the case law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union and secondary Union law». 
54 ECJ, 30 September 2003, case C-224/01, Köbler v. Republik Österreich. 
55 Article 22(1) UPC Agreement. 
56 Article 22(2), first sentence UPC Agreement. 
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which is deemed liable for the entire amount of damages awarded in a given 
case 57 and, finally, the right to obtain a proportional restitution from the other 
contracting States, though further implementing provisions in this regard are ex-
pected to be taken by the UPC Administrative Committee 58. 
 
 
3.8 The mere internal capacity of the UPC. – Unlike its predecessor, the UPC 
does not enjoy international personality. First, such a conclusion would be 
against a construction inherently built into Member State judiciaries. Second, it 
must be remembered that Opinion No 1/09 rejected the previous model of a uni-
fied patent court arguing inter alia that that body was outside the institutional 
framework of the EU: it was not part of the judicial system provided for in Arti-
cle 19(1) TEU, being instead «an organization with a distinct legal personality 
under international law» 59, an element which the ECJ rejected in toto. Since it 
should be presumed that contracting Member States did not intend to surrepti-
tiously circumvent the ECJ findings, that feature has been dismissed by the UPC 
Agreement. Article 2 shows a corresponding will among contracting States be-
cause it just imposes the obligation to recognize that the UPC enjoys the «most 
extensive legal capacity» accorded to legal persons under the domestic law of 
each contracting State. It clearly refers to internal personality which appears nec-
essary to fulfill its tasks within the contracting States’legal order. Such a provision 
must be presumptively considered as contrary to the UPC international personal-
ity being acquired. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The UPC judicial system has an immediate double purpose: to reduce legal 
costs for patent holders and industry, and to achieve ‘procedural economies’for 
the contracting States. Meanwhile, the design of the UPC as a ‘common’ body 
shows quite a unique construct in the landscape of judiciaries stemming from in-
ternational treaties. The power to adjudicate, which usually resides within the ex-
clusive remit of the national systems, becomes a common task carried out by a 
mutually integrated judicature. The national authorities are divested from the 
contracting States and transferred to the new judicature. International and inter-
nal (i.e. the ratione loci competence) power to adjudicate are governed by uni-
form provisions. It follows that the adjudication is not only internationally coor-
dinated, but it is also conceived as a joint function, and is construed as if it were, 
 
57 Article 22(2), second sentence UPC Agreement. 
58 Article 22(3) UPC Agreement. 
59 Opinion No 1/09 cit., para 71. 
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and indeed is, a uniform and common matter either. If justice for individual liti-
gations is delivered as a joint function, that entails relevant consequences in terms 
of recognition and enforcement of judgments, as highlighted above. In the long 
run, it would come as no surprise if this unified judicial system, alongside a genu-
ine patent with unitary effect, affects the traditional territoriality of patents. 
The specificity of this judiciary construction is even showed by its composi-
tion: judges are not separately appointed by each government, but by a common 
body. They should be considered as totally independent from governments, rep-
resenting instead, at least ideally, a common idea of justice based on quality, in-
dependence and efficiency as key components of an effective judicial system 60. 
Overall, this peculiar construct is easier to understand and rationalize bearing 
in mind the purpose for which it was enacted and the reasons that led to it. Quite 
revealing are its origin and the primary need to reshape a previous failed attempt 
to found a unified jurisdiction, in order to comply with a number of requirements 
set out by the ECJ in Opinion No 1/09. Even assuming that the UPC Agreement 
pertains to the exclusive competence of the Member States, arguing that it con-
cerns how to settle individual litigations in a specific field of civil law, nonetheless 
the States’autonomous capacity to act does encounter limits, notably when that 
activity concerns matters already governed by the EU legal framework. The judi-
cial regime of patent is all the more strictly intertwined with the EU legal system. 
The UPC will eventually be absorbed into the EU framework by virtue of Article 
19(1), second sub para, TEU, Member States having to provide «remedies suffi-
cient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law». 
Like national judges, the UPC becomes a unitary and constituent part of the legal 
system protecting individual rights, i.e. an essential part of the EU legal order. 
The UPC Agreement offers a truly peculiar design of judiciary, perhaps not al-
ways perfect 61, but ultimately containing several elements of a closely integrated 
judiciary which is not so far from a federal concept of justice. 
  
 
60 No doubt inefficiencies in the UPC judicial system may impact the whole EU single 
market negatively. If ‘the unitary court takes a lax attitude’, that would be detrimental for the 
EU law patent system, as has been rightly pointed out (T. JAEGER, The EU Patent, cit., p. 78), 
but also for the judicial system of EU law as a whole. 
61 For critical remarks see T. JAEGER, The EU Patent cit., p. 84 and R. HILTY, T. JAEGER, 
M. LAMPING, H. ULLRICH, The Unitary Patent Package: Twelve Reasons for Concern, Max 
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper No 12-12. 
Some of these concerns have been addressed in the subsequent stages of negotiations. 
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